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WORKING RULES FOR ASSURING NONDISCRIMINATION
IN HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATION
IN recent years a few state courts 1 and legislatures 2 have become increas-
ingly aware of the potentialities for unfairness and discrimination inherent in
the broad powers of self-regulation enjoyed by the American medical profes-
sion 3 and its associated voluntary hospitals. 4 But until the recent Fourth Cir-
cuit decision in Simpkins v. Moses H. Cone General Hospital,0 the only fed-
eral court involvement in this area had been peripheral.0 In Cone, the Fourth
Circuit rushed in where, five years before, it had feared to tread,7 and pro-
scribed discrimination against Negro doctors, dentists and patients in federal-
ly-aided voluntary hospitals. It held that (a) acceptance of state-channelled
federal funds for construction brought hospital discrimination within the pro-
hibitions of the fifth and the fourteenth amendments,8 and (b) the "separate
1. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A2d 817 (1963) ; Falcone v. Mid-
dlesex County Medical Society, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A2d 791 (1961).
2. See, e.g., recent developments in New York indicating a tendency to curb hospital
and medical powers of self regulation. These include enactment of a system of "medical
audits" to help provide a check on quality of medical care (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch.
326), limitation upon the numbers of physicians serving on the boards of medical service
corporations (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 719), barring of discrimination against physi-
cians by private institutions (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 913) and setting up a system of
licensure for chiropractors, allowing them to use X-ray equipment and including a "grand-
father clause' for the benefit of current practitioners (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 295).
This last enactment was a legislative reversal of Chiropractic Ass'n v. Hilleboe, 16 App.
Div. 2d 285, 228 N.Y.S.2d 358, aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 109, 187 N.E.2d 756, 237 N.Y.S2d 289
(1962), in which the court allowed the Public Health Council of New York, a govern-
mental body dominated by physicians, to effectively bar chiropractors from using X-ray
machines, essential to their practice.
3. See Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and Politics
h Organized Mfedicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938 (1954).
4. See Hanmsox, CO=TROL OF MEDICAL STAFF ApxOiNTMENrS Ir VoLUz;TAR Non;-
PROFIT HosprrALs (Am. Hospital Ass'n 1963). A "voluntary" hospital is one operated
on a non-profit basis by a private charitable trust or religious group. It is to be dis-
tinguished from "public' (government-owned) hospitals and "proprietary" (private, but
operated for profit) hospitals. In 1962, 2276 accredited American hospitals were classified
as voluntary, 524 as public and 154 as proprietary. Id. at 4.
5. 323 F.2, 959 (4th Cir. 1963), reversing 211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1962), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
6. Federal courts have moved against discrimination against physicians because of
membership in group health plans. The Group Health Cases: United States v. American
Medical Ass n, 28 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1939), af'd, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940), conviction on remand upheld, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942),
aff'd in part, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). In noneconomic contexts, the Federal rule has remained
one of nonintervention. Shulman v. Washington Hospital Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C.
1963).
7. Eaton v. Walker Memorial Hosp., 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958).
8. 323 F.2d 959, 967.
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but equal" proviso to the non-discrimination clause of the Hospital Survey
and Construction Act (the "Hill-Burton Act") and the regulations promul-
gated thereunder were unconstitutional. 9 Certiorari was denied.1 0
Of the two holdings, the second, while at first glance more dramatic,"1 is
the less important. It will apply only to future federal expenditures under the
Hill-Burton Act ;12 the Secretary has announced his acquiescence ;18 and Title
VI of the recently passed Civil Rights Act 14 bars the use of federal funds in
situations such as that presented in Cone. The first holding is not only broader
9. Id. at 969-70. The statute provides:
Within six months after August 13, 1946, the Surgeon General ... shall by general
regulation prescribe...
(f) That the State plan shall provide for adequate hospital facilities for the
people residing in a State, without discrimination on account of race, creed or color,
and shall provide for adequate hospital facilities for persons unable to pay therefor.
Such regulation may require that before approval of any application for a hospital
or addition to a hospital is recommended by a State agency, assurance shall be
received by the State from the applicant that (1) such hospital or addition to a
hospital will be made available to all persons residing in the territorial area of the
applicant, without discrimniation on account of race, creed, or color, but an excep-
tion shall be made in cases where separate hospital facilities are providcd for
separate population groups, if the plan makes equitable provision oi the basis of
need for facilities and services of like quality for each such group; and (2) there
will be made available in each such hospital or addition to a hospital a reasonable
volume of hospital services to persons unable to pay therefor, but an exception shall
be made if such a requirement is not feasible from a financial standpoint.
60 Stat. 1042 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 291e (1958) (emphasis supplied). Only the italicized
language was held unconstitutional. The regulations contain a similar non-discrimination
provision followed by a proviso allowing its waiver if (a) the state agency finds "equitable
provision, on the basis of need" for the excluded group and (b) the finding is approved
by the Surgeon General. 42 C.F.R. § 53.112 (1960). "Relevant regulations" - presumably
meaning the proviso - were said by the court to fall within the unconstitutional portion
of the statute. 323 F.2d at 969-70.
10. 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
11. The United States, intervening, had urged "unusually enough" the unconstitu-
tionality of the statute and regulations. 323 F.2d 959, 962.
12. The Surgeon General's power to apply sanctions for noncompliance with § 291e(f)
regulations is limited to withholding certification of further fund requests for any project
or projects designated by him as affected by the default. 60 Stat. 1047 (1946), 42 U.S.C,
§ 291(j) (1958). Once Federal funds are paid, they may be recovered only if the hospital
is converted to proprietary operation. 60 Stat. 1046 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 2911(e) (1958).
13. Testimony of Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, reported in the New
York Times, Mar. 10, 1964, p. 20, cols. 1, 2. Indeed, if "assurances of non-discrimination,
applying to patients, staff privileges and admissions, will be required in all hospital pro-
jects built with Federal aid," ibid., the Federal government is going somewhat beyond
the limits in the first Cone holding, for the general non-discrimination, provision of § 291e
(f) seems to apply only to patients. See note 9 supra.
14. Title VI, § 601, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). Perhaps the
denial of certiorari can be traced to the pendeney of this measure. Previous similar legis.
lative proposals had received the support of the American Hospital Association. Hospitals,
Sept. 16, 1963, p. 95.
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than the second, 1' but also lays the doctrinal underpinnings for an exercise of
judicial control over internal hospital affairs far more sweeping than any pre-
viously attempted. 16 In establishing a right to relief for excluded Negro phy-
sicians, dentists and patients, the court not only effectively overruled prior de-
cisions permitting such discrimination against Negroes,17 but also enunciated
a rule which seems to proscribe any discrimination based on race, religion or
national origin' 8 in any area of hospital activity.'9
15. It is retrospective in barring discrimination in any hospital which has accepted
Federal funds; it dearly bars discrimination in any facility of such a hospital, while
§ 291e(f) seems to bar it only in the facility constructed with federal aid; finally, not
only does the holding apply by its terms to doctors, patients and dentists, but there is no
reason to suppose its reasoning should not equally apply to all hospital employees.
16. Voluntary hospital staff selection has been generally regarded as private action
susceptible to judicial review only when. either (a) it becomes involved with the public
interest and the hospital officials abuse their discretion, see cases cited in note 1 supra,
or (b) when it is a statutory or common-law crime. See The Group Health Cases, note
6 supra. In general, courts have been very reluctant to find public interest or involvement.
See, e.g., Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conr Supp. 55 (Super. Ct. 1958) ; Straus v. Marl-
boro County General Hosp., 185 S.C. 425, 194 S.E. 65 (1937). Without such involve-
ment, even seemingly arbitrary staff expulsion has no remedy. Hughes v. Good Samaritan
Hosp., 289 Ky. 123, 158 S.W.2d 159 (1942); State ex rel. Wolf v. LaCrosse Lutheran
Hosp. Ass'n, 181 Wis. 33, 193 N.V.2d 994 (1923) [citing Anonymous' Case, 90 Eng. Rep.
331 (K.B. 1687)]. For an. unsuccessful attempt to apply civil anti-trust sanctions, see
United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952). Even in the case of
publicly-owned hospitals, although there are some cases to the contrary [eg., Wyatt v.
Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 345 P.2d 93 (1959)], courts generally
have declined to review staff appointments because they fall within staff discretion unless
appointments or exclusions are "arbitrary." See, e.g., Dayan v. Wood River Township
Hosp., 18 Ill. App. 2d 263 (1958); Dade County v. Trombly, 102 So. 2d 394 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1958); Green v. City of St. Petersburg, 154 Fla. 339, 17 So. 2d 517 (1944);
Selden v. City of Sterling, 316 Ill. App. 455 (1942).
Since, however, the first Cone holding makes hospital practices "state action" in the
sense that the phrase is applied in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961), the court need not apply these threshold tests of jurisdiction; instead, it can pro-
scribe directly any hospital staff exclusion as contrary to the fourteenth amendment.
17. Apparently the only previous federal cases directly involving exclusion of Negroes
are those involving James Walker Memorial Hospital. Admission was denied. Eaton v.
Walker Memorial Hosp., 164 F. Supp. 191 (E.D.N.C. 1958), aff'd, 261 F.2d 521 (4th
Cir. 1958). Relitigation following Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority was unsuc-
cessful. Eaton v. Grubbs, 216 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.C. 1963), despite a Fifth Circuit
dictum that the previous case had been overruled sub .silentio by Burton. Hampton v. City
of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962). Apparently the only state court case in-
volving exclusion of Negroes in a medical context is Hillary v. Pedic Soe'y, 189 App.
Div. 766, 129 N.Y.S. 62 (1919) (expulsion of Negro from "Pedic Society" held proce-
durally improper). However, state and federal rules sanctioning broad hospital discretion
in excluding anyone (see note 16 supra) certainly also apply to Negroes.
18. This case of course raises problems in regard to denominationally owned and
operated voluntary hospitals. An attempt to proscribe religious discrimination by such
institutions might run head-on into a first amendment freedom of religion argument.
However, this Note does not attempt to deal with such issues, confining itself instead to
discrimination, chiefly against Negroes, practiced by non-religious voluntary hospitals.
19. By the terms of the decision the hospital is unable to make any classification or
distinction which would be improperly made by the state which acts through it, and any
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A court faced with the task of enforcing this mandate will be compelled to
examine complex areas of internal hospital activity into which the courts have
never before closely inquired. While a court should have relatively little diffi-
culty mastering the intricacies of hospital administrative machinery, it may
face substantially greater problems in deciding cases in which a differentiation
is defended on the ground that it is medically necessary, either because it is an
element of the most prudent course of treatment for a given patient, or be-
cause it is essential to the maintenance of the quality of medical care available
to all patients. There is little doubt that such considerations will be invoked
to justify hospital policies in Cone-type enforcement cases; they have been the
constant theme of hospital spokesmen in other situations - such as labor dis-
putes 20 - in which attempts have been made to exert external control over
internal hospital policies. It seems equally certain that a court which acted to
bar hospital discrimination without keeping such considerations in mind might
run the risk of inadvertently lowering the quality of medical care. Of course,
a policy of non-discrimination is in itself in no way inconsistent with high
medical standards; indeed it should work to raise them substantially. The
danger, however, lies in the potential lowering of care standards that might
result from an uninformed attempt to summarily order non-discrimination, or
alternatively, in the possibility of judicial inaction which might be encouraged
by vigorous hospital arguments that any change would detrimentally affect the
quality of care.21 The maintenance of care standards is a social goal given
great value in our society, however irrationally this value is pursued,22 and
the court enforcing non-discrimination should therefore undertake to do so in
classification, in any area of state behavior made on the basis of race, religion or national
origin is, barring unusual circumstances, [cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) ] improper.
20. See, e.g., The Modern Hospital, June 1959, pp. 63-64. Moreover, courts have been
receptive to this argument. See, e.g., Society of New York I-Iosp. v. Hanson, 185 Misc.
937, 943, 59 N.Y.S.2d 91, 96 (1945), aff'd, 272 App. Div. 998, 73 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1947).
21. Quality would surely be affected if a court, finding racial exclusion, were to order
a hospital staff to accept chiropractors. See New York Times, Mar. 26, 1964, p. 16, col. 7.
See also text accompanying notes 50-53 i nfra.
22. American hospitals alone were said to employ 1,840,000 workers in 1963, as com-
pared to 830,000 in 1946. Hospitals, Aug. 1, 1962, p. 482. In addition, many more are em-
ployed in the supplying of drugs, hospital supplies and other ancillary medical needs. Total
hospital expenditures for 1963 were $10,956,000,000. Ibid. Total annual expenditures for
medical care in the United States have been estimated to be 33 billion dollars. HAtIIIS,
THE EcoomiLcs OF Am.IucAr MEDICINE (1964). In spite of the resources expended for
medical care, it could be argued that the quality of care is not so important a value that
it should ever be balanced against 14th amendment rights of Negro citizens. The impor-
tance given care standards, an importance which allows them to take precedence over such
established values as enlightened labor policy (see note 20 "tupra) seems strange when
it is considered that the reason for maintaining high care standards is the preservation
of human life and health and this in turn is a value which is compromised in favor of
such values as convenience (in allowing operation of private automobiles at high speeds)




a manner which has the least deleterious effect on those standards.- Such a
court, then, faced with the argument that an allegedly discriminatory practice
is necessary to protect care quality, should (a) determine whether the argu-
ment is mere sham and (b) if it is not, devise a mode of enforcement which
does not endanger the quality of care.'
The four areas of voluntary hospital activity in which discriminatory prac-
tices are likely to arise are education and training programs, employment,
patient admission and treatment, and medical and professional staff appoint-
ment. Clearly, no substantial argument can be made to justify the exclusion of
academically qualified minority group applicants 25 from admission to hospital
schools and training courses for nursing, laboratory technology and other
"health" professions on the basis of protection of standards of care.m Nor can
any more than de ininimis defenses for discrimination in hiring of unskilled
or skilled hospital employees be raised on the basis of maintaining care qual-
ity.Y Consequently, a court faced with such arguments should not hesitate in
ordering an end to discrimination. Similarly unjustifiable on medical grounds
is a policy which, like that of the Moses H. Cone General Hospital,2 calls for
23. The court should, however, keep in mind that even, if a policy of non-discrimina-
tion is enforced in a manner which, because of some of the factors discussed ir this Note,
inadvertently results in a reduction in the quality of care in a hospital such as that in
Cone, the overall level of medical care in the community would still probably rise sub-
stantially. Whatever the level of care at Moses H. Cone General Hospital would be after
the most hastily-conceived desegregation order, it would almost surely be higher than that
previously provided for excluded Negro citizens, whose infant mortality rate is twice that
of white residents of North Carolina, and whose maternal death rate is five times that of
whites. See Suncommr= ox MEDicAL CARE OF THE NoRTr CAROLNA AnvxsoR" Com-
Am= To T UNrED STATES CSXMssIIO ON CIVM MIGHTS, EQuAL. PnorEcoN OF
THE LAws CoNcERNmG MEicAL, C-ARE r Noamr CA0or =., Appendix K. (Cited in the
Cone case at 323 F.2d 970 n.23). It could be argued that, whatever the lowering effect on
Cone Hospital care standards, summary admission of Negro physicians and their patients
would be justified by a corresponding increase in the overall standard of care.
24. This Note does not undertake to deal with the difficult evidentiary problems that
arise in proving a case that racial discrimination exists in a hospital - it is instead con-
cerned with dealing with defenses which may be raised once such a showing has been
made.
25. This Note does not deal with exclusion of non-Catholics from schools and train-
ing courses run by Catholic hospitals. See note 18 supra. Nor does it attack the problem
presented by non-discriminatory application of academic qualifications, which do in fact
discriminate against Negroes, because of their previous educational deprivation.
26. Probably the only argument which could be offered would be one going to the
morale or mental condition of patients cared for by nurses or student nurses who are
members of a minority group the patients hate or fear. Such an argument must be dis-
missed as de innimis. See text accompanying notes 36-38 infra. Since hospital training
programs are often supervised, or even supported by state educational departments, they
are subject to desegregation under Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 4S3 (1954), as well
as under Cone.
27. Or, of course, professional persons, such as nurses, pathologists and chemists,
who are employees of the hospital.
28. 323 F.2d 959, 962.
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the turning away of patients simply because they are members of minority
groups. Absent a showing that the hospital was full 29 or unequipped to deal
with the patient's condition 3 0 or that valid medical judgment had counseled
an exclusionary policy applied without regard to race, religion or national
origin,8 ' a court should again not hesitate in ordering a hospital to admit
minority-group patients.8 2
29. Immediate admission to a hospital is seldom gained by a patient who does not
require emergency treatment or surgery or who is not in labor. For surgical procedures
or courses of treatment which are "elective" (i.e. which need not be done immediately)
the waiting period for admission in most hospitals is six to twelve weeks.
30. A hospital specializing in the treatment of a specified disease, such as tuberculosis,
could legitimately refuse to admit an appendicitis patient; similarly a general hospital
could decline to treat a tubercular patient if it had no facilities for isolating him from
other patients.
31. One example of such a practice would be the policy, widely followed before de-
velopment of poliomyelitis vaccines, of closing all pediatric wards and services to non-
emergency patients during summer months.
32. Unfortunately, if the patient is not admitted to the hospital following such order
on the grounds that he cannot pay the bill, there is nothing, under the mandate of Cone,
that the court can do about it. Few hospitals still provide the free charity service that was
the original purpose of American hospitals. BELKNAP & STEINLE, Tim COMMUNITY AND
ITS HosPrrALs 9 (1963). As mounting costs have made the performance of this charity
function impossible, some voluntary hospitals have concluded arrangements with govern-
ment welfare services to provide emergency services and treatment of the indigent patients,
while others have simply ceased to provide these services entirely. Voluntary hospitals
have been categorized as economically "unrestricted" (providing such services) and eco-
nomically "restricted" (not providing them). Id. at 30-35. While the financial position
of the economically unrestricted hospital is likely to be somewhat precarious (id. at 16),
the economically restricted hospital often shows a substantial surplus, which is seldom
used to reduce costs to the patient, but is instead salted away in "reserve" accounts. Id,
at 29. Economic discrimination is clearly practiced against patients in at least some eco-
nomically restricted hospitals (id. at 41), and since Negroes are often in the low-income
group (id. at 86), there seems little doubt such practices could be followed for racial
reasons, by a hospital eager to avoid the effect of Cone. Indeed, Negroes seem to be ex-
periencing already some such "economic" discrimination, even in the North. See In1tegra-
tion: What Is Hospital's Role, Hospitals, Oct. 16, 1963, p. 17. Not only does Cone not
deal with this problem, but it allows to stand a portion of the act which aggravates It.
One of the indices used for allocation of funds under the act is the "support rate" of a
hospital - the amount of money made available to the hospital per patient admitted.
BELKNAP & STmELE op. cit. mspra at 51. This rate is higher in economically restricted
hospitals because they simply refuse to admit patients who cannot pay. The act thus en-
courages hospitals to become economically restricted. Since there seems every likelihood
that economically restrictive hospital practices may be used to keep out Negroes, a court
might, were a case presented, go beyond Cone, and declare unconstitutional under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments, the second proviso to § 291e(f) of the act, which allows a
hospital to follow economically restrictive policies if it shows that it is "not feasible from
a financial standpoint ' to follow its statutory duty to "provide ... adequate hospital
facilities for persons unable to pay therefor." 60 Stat. 1043 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 291e(f)
(1958). Such a holding would share the limitations of the second Cone holding (see note
12 supra), however, applying only prospectively and only to the particular facility built with
federal aid. For these reasons, legislation is probably the only means of preventing wide-
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Once such a patient has been admitted, discriminatory practices do not
necessarily come to an end. He may be given qualitatively inferior medical
care 33 or, more likely, while receiving care as good as that of his non-minority
fellow, be subjected to what might be called administrative discrimination -
segregation by room, ward or the affixing of some distinctive badge of in-
feriority.3s Attempt may be made to justify administrative discrimination as
essential to the therapy of a given patient or class of patients. Such an argu-
ment would probably take one of hvo forms. The first would be a contention
that labeling members of a racial or minority group is justifiable because
differing physical characteristics of the group affect the medical treatment of
its members. This argument is unpersuasive; although there are a few medical-
ly significant differences between races which might occasionally be central to
the treatment of the patient,35 the ease with which the physician can ascertain
the patient's race makes any racial "labeling" of patients unnecessary.3 0 A
second argument might be that attitudes of patients make some kind of internal
hospital segregation necessary - the ill-feeling between the races being such
that sharing of rooms and facilities would create an atmosphere of resentment
or tension adverse to the progress of therapy, or might even result in vio-
lence.37 It is true that tension and resentment might retard a patient's recovery
to some extent. Such factors, however, do not generally seem to be considered
of great importance in hospital treatment; little is done to assuage similar
feelings caused by patients' sudden subjection to other features of the hospital
environment.3 s Moreover, even hospitalized Americans must accommodate
themselves to the fourteenth amendment. The patient might equally resent
spread discrimination against Negroes by hospitals which choose to become economically
restricted.
33. The possibility that this particular kind of discrimination will be practiced sys-
tematically - in the manner that Negro Americans have been systematically denied jus-
tice before the law in parts of the United States - seems unlikely. If conscious adminis-
tration of poor quality medical care to a Negro patient takes place, it is far more probable
that it will result from the irresponsibility of an individual physician or hospital employee.
Such cases, it may be suggested, are seldom likely to come before the courts.
34. As for instance, requiring Negro persons to list their race on an admission blank,
or alloting Negro or other minority group patients a particular color of chart. Requesting
religious minority members to list their religion can, of course, be justified on the grounds
that such listing is for the purpose of notifying the hospital chaplain of that religion or of
respecting dietary preferences.
35. The blood condition, sickle-cell anemia, for instance, apparently occurs only in
Negroes or persons of Negro ancestry. See S iz 's MnrcAI. DicrzoNARy 97 (1961).
36. The examining physician, in most cases, should be able to determine the patient's
race as easily as he does his sex, and note it upon the patient's medical record.
37. Both arguments have been- offered in recent hospital disputes involving racial dis-
crimination. See Integration: What is Hospital's Role, Hospitals, Oct. 18, 1963, p. 19.
38. While some hospitals permit mothers to accompany child patients into the hos-
pital, or allow husbands to remain with their wives during labor (e.g. Grace-New Haven
Community Hospital, New Haven, Conn., communication from the Office of Admissions,
Mar. 1, 1964) little seems to be done otherwise to minimize what has been called the "loss
of ego identity" experienced by the patient. CoSFR, LmF ON THE WVARDS 99 (1962).
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sending his children to a desegregated school; his racial sensibilities do not
gain constitutional immunity because he is ill. While very unusual medical
circumstances 39 might conceivably justify isolated instances of what is here
called administrative discrimination, a court may safely dismiss medical argt-
ments in favor of any general or widespread administratively discriminatory
practice in patient treatment.
It is in the fourth area of hospital activity, medical staff membership prac-
tices,4 0 that enforcement of a policy of non-discrimination is most likely to
inadvertently endanger the quality of medical care. Modern medical treatment
requires mechanical, electronic and pharmacological resources 41 unavailable
anywhere except in a hospital. To deny the use of these facilities to a phy-
sician is to restrict his practice to simple therapeutic procedures - in effect
partially to delicense him. The lot of a physician excluded from the medical
staff of the hospital in his area is the unhappy one of being denied the oppor-
tunity to give any treatment that cannot be carried out in his office or his
patients' homes. And the lot of his patients - should they require major
therapy - is to be denied the services of the physician in whom they have
reposed their trust. Nor is it generally practical for a group of excluded phy-
sicians to start their own hospital.42 Negro physicians and patients commonly
find themselves in this situation, in northern 43 as well as in southern 44 areas
of the United States.
Recognizing that hospital exclusion can amount to partial deprivation of the
state-granted right 45 to practice medicine, some courts taking jurisdiction
over hospital staff disputes have seen staff exclusions as improper private
usurpations of state licensing functions, and have viewed hospital staffs which
exclude duly licensed physicians as combinations in restraint of trade. Seek-
39. One example is the treatment of a mental patient whose symptoms include hatred
or fear of another race or group in a short term psychiatric treatment center in a general
hospital or in a mental hospital.
40. The medical staff of a hospital is a voluntary association of physicians permitted
by the hospital to practice their art, as independent contractors, using the hospital's facil-
ities.
41. Artificial kidneys, electroencephalographic and X-ray equipment and substantial
supplies of whole blood and various parental solutions are examples of the modern thera-
peutic tools which only hospitals can maintain.
42. Among other considerations militating against such an attempt are its possible
tax consequences. Cf. Howard v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 833 (1963).
43. Over 250 of Chicago's approximately 300 Negro physicians are general prac-
titioners. All of the general practitioners are said to have been denied hospital staff ap-
pointments, "because hospitals need specialists." Integration: What Is Hospital's Role,
Hospitals, Oct. 16, 1963, pp. 20-21.
44. The N.A.A.C.P. has estimated that Cone will affect discriminatory practices in
approximately 2,000 medical facilities in 14 southern and "border" states. New York
Times, Mar. 26, 1964, p. 16, col. 7.
45. The status of a license to practice as a "right" or a "privilege" is, of course, still
unresolved. Cf. Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1926) ; Reich, The New Property,
73 YA'.= L.J. 733, 735, 740 (1964).
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ing to remedy these abuses, courts have applied "freedom of choice of phy-
sician" statutes,46 broad formulations of public policy,47 state anti-trust law 48
and even section three of the Sherman Act.49 This kind of solution, pointing
toward judicially-compelled staff admission for all properly licensed physicians,
presents a simple and direct method of realizing the goal of non-discrimination.
However, it also endangers the quality of medical care, for one of its premises
- that state licensing machinery exerts effective control over medical com-
petence - is false. In fact, state licensure requirements, adequate a half-cen-
tury ago, have been rendered obsolete by the rapid progress of medical knowl-
edge. The field of surgery provides an example. Typical state license statutes 0
require proof of graduation from an accredited medical school, one year's in-
ternship, and successful completion of a basic science examination. When most
state statutes were enacted, amputation and simple abdominal operations con-
stituted the bulk of surgical practice, and surgeons rarely had more than one
year of training after graduation from medical school. 1 Today, surgical pro-
cedures involving the stopping of the patient's heart for long periods are
routine, and transplantation of vital organs is being attempted with increasing
frequency. Most of the training which enables the surgeon to carry out these
and other modern procedures is obtained during residency and other post-
graduate specialty'training5 2 following internship; the completion of medical
school is, for the modern surgeon, only the beginning of his course of study.
Yet under state statutes any licensed physician may undertake any surgical
procedure, even though he has undergone no residency training, and though
his entire knowledge of surgical technique may have been gained from three
medical school lecture courses and four "clerkship" courses which involved
assisting at operations.5 3 Similar gulfs between statutory requirements and
46. Stribling v. Jolley, 253 S.NV.2d 519 (Mo. 1952) ; Albert v. Gogebic County Pub.
Hosp., 341 Mfich. 344, 67 N.W.2d 244 (1954).
47. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
48. Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568 (1962).
49. The Group Health Cases, note 6 stpra.
50. See e.g., N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 45:9-6 and 9-7 (Supp. 1963), the statute applied in the
Greisnan case.
51. Most of these statutes were passed around the turn of the century. Postgraduate
internship programs were inaugurated at about the same time. Cope, The Education of the
Doctor, in THE HosprAr.AL i CONTEMLOARY Lrn 168 (Faxon ed. 1949).
52. Specialists, particularly surgeons, often spend more years in postgraduate study
than in medical school. Cf. Ibid.
53. These are the requirements for graduation of the Yale School of Medicine. Can-
didates-for the M.D. degree must complete:
Surgery 103, General Surgical Ward and Dispensary Clerkship.
Surgery 104, Orthopedic Ward and Dispensary Clerkship.
Surgery 105, Urologic Ward and Dispensary Clerkship.
Surgery 106, Neurosurgical Ward and Dispensary Clerkship.
Surgery 107, Otolaryngology.
Surgery 108, Ophthalmology.
Surgery 109, Surgical Clinic.
YALE U vn. srry, BuLuzrn, Series 60, No. 17, 113-16 (Sept. 1, 1964).
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the actual training necessary to carry out complex therapy exist in other areas
of medicine. State licensing schemes, instead of requiring the level of skill
necessary for many of the more complex areas of modern practice, only call
for the kind of training needed for elementary procedures. Staff exclusion is
the only prior restraint presently operating to prevent minimally-trained phy-
sicians from attempting complex therapy far beyond their level of skill.64 Staff
rules require a physician to demonstrate a high level of competence before lie
is allowed to perform complex procedures; they allow for periodic reappoint-
ment to the staff to assure that he retains his competence, and provide ma-
chinery to allow evaluation of his performance r in order that his competence
may be continually judged. Rather than usurping state functions in regulating
medicine, staff rules fill a regulatory vacuum; hospital staffs are the only
organs which realistically exercise control over medical quality.60
Thus, the issue is joined. The court seeking to enforce the staff non-dis-
crimination mandate of Cone must do so in a manner calculated to have the
least deletrious effect on the quality of medical care, currently protected by
staff selection policies. A number of possible solutions may be suggested: the
court might order hospital appointment for all who meet the statutory stand-
ards, but urge the legislature to enact new licensing laws requiring the high
level of competence now required by hospital staff rules; the court might it-
self apply a new higher standard; it might appoint an impartial expert to
administer the nondiscriminatory application of proper competence standards;
it might leave the enforcement of standards to the hospital staff and attempt
by some kind of partial review to assure that race is not used as a criterion;
or finally, the court might very well effectively abdicate, and content itself with
a mere exhortation to the hospital to operate its self-regulatory system with-
out regard to race. Each of these lines of attack must be evaluated in terms
54. Speaking of the other restraints on the quality of practice, both prior and sub-
sequent, Dr. Albert W. Snoke, former president of the American Hospital Association,
has written:
If a physician was doing inadequate surgery in a community, what actual power or
influence towards either preventing him, correcting him, or controlling him exists
in the county medical society, the state medical society, the AMA, the specialty
boards in surgery or subspecialties, the various societies or colleges in surgery or
its subspecialties, or organizations like the American College of Surgeons (?)
The answer is that if that surgeon or pseudo-surgeon wishes to continue as he has
in the past and possesses a license to practice medicine and surgery in the state
... he can do whatever he pleases within the limitations of his conscience or the
gullibility of his patients. He really has to be terrible or crooked before any of these
bodies will even do anything more than to regard him with horror. This includes
the State Board of Medical Examiners or the State Department of Health.
Letter, Dec. 16, 1963, on file in Yale Law Library.
55. See, e.g., GRAcE-Naw HAvF COMMUNITY HOSPITAL BY-LAws FOR THE M EDICAL
STAFF, March 1, 1960 (revised Nov. 28, 1962) [hereinafter cited as Grace-New Haven
By-laws]; and AiamncAN HosPrrAL AssocIATIoN, Model Medical Staff By-laws, Rules
and Regulations, HosprrAL AccREDITATiox REF E ENCs (rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Model By-laws].
56. Letter from Dr. Albert W. Snoke, supra note 54.
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of its efficacy in enforcing the mandate of Cone, and in allowing maintenance
of the highest practical standard of care as compared to the present medical
staff procedure.
The goal of present staff procedure is to delineate exactly the competence
of each member-physician and the medical and surgical procedures he shall
have the privilege of carrying ouL The device adopted to this end is division
of medical practice into a number of specialty areas,r7 within each of which a
hierarchy of competence is created."" Each member of the staff occupies one
or more of the specific pigeonholes within this system and must be periodically
reappointed to it.59 Appointment is by the hospital governing board, on the
recommendation of physicians at the top of the hierarchy within each specialty
department, acting either in the capacity of department heads r0 or as mem-
bers of one of the operating committees of the staff.6 ' In the case of refusal to
reappoint or demotion in the hierarchy, bylaws often contain provisions for
hearing 62 and appeal to a committee of the hospital board.03 In addition to
the erection of the hierarchy of competence, staff devices for policing care-
quality include credentials, medical records and tissue committees, necropsy
conferences and consultation requirements, some of which have informal sanc-
tions less severe than demotion in the hierarchy " and all of which serve as
sources of information regarding the performance of a particular physician to
supplement that which his superiors in the hierarchy gain by day-to-day ob-
servation.65 On the basis of these data, the performance of each member of
57. In a small hospital, the division can be simply one between medicine and surgery.
In a large one, as many as ten full departments, each with various autonomous and semi-
autonomous subdepartments may be created. Cf. Grace-New Haven By-laws, Art. VI.
58. See, e.g., recommended division into honorary, consulting, active, associate and
courtesy staff members. Model By-laws, Art. IV, §§ 2-6.
59. The usual period is one year. See, e.g., Model By-laws, Art. III, § 3.
60. See Grace-New Haven By-laws, Art. IV, § 4(B).
61. Only the credentials committee is specifically mentioned in the appointments sec-
tion, of the Model By-laws, Art. III, § 4(5), but other policing committees, such as medical
records and tissues, are required to submit periodic reports to the executive committee,
which would, if they had bearing on appointment or reappointment, submit them to the
medical staff as a whole, which in turn must approve the department head and credentials
committee recommendations (Model By-lazws, Art. III, § 3(1)) to the hospital governing
board.
62. Model By-laws, Art. III, § 5.
63. Grace-New Haven By-laws, Art. IV, § 4(C).
64. Credentials committees evaluate the qualifications of physicians applying for staff
appointment; medical records committees insure that proper records are kept of the course
of each patient's treatment (including any data which might demonstrate negligence or
had judgment of the physician) ; tissue committees compare pathology reports on opera-
tively removed tissue with preoperative diagnoses; necropsy conferences are informal de-
partmental inquiries convened when a patient dies in the course of treatment; consultation
requirements are staff rules making mandatory a check on diagnosis by a second qualified
physician before certain dangerous procedures are carried out.
65. Cf. Model By-laws, Art. VI, § 2(2): "[P]rivileges shall be based upon an
applicant's training, experience, and demonstrated competence which shall be evaluated
by review of the applicant's credentials, direct observation by the active medical staff, and
review of reports of the Medical Records and Tissue Committees...."
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the staff is continually evaluated, and his position in the hierarchy changed if
necessary. The number of steps 66 available within the hierarchy in all but the
smallest hospitals makes it possible with some exactitude to place a physician
at a level which corresponds to his qualifications. And in the case of the erring
physician, a graduated series of sanctions, none of which extends to complete
delicensure 67 assures that no misdeed will go unpunished for lack of an appro-
priate disciplinary measure.
Incentive for scrupulous enforcement of this regulatory scheme by the medi-
cal staff on its own members is provided by the joint Commission on Accredi-
tation of Hospitals (JCAH) 68 which pays careful attention to medical staff
structure, standards and rule enforcement when accrediting an institution, and
which can work economic hardship on a hospital by refusing accreditation.
In practice, the actual levels of competence required for each particular
step in the hierarchy at a given hospital tend to rise under JCAH pressure as
far as is consistent with the quality of medical personnel available in a given
area.70 These levels therefore tend to respond both to general improvements
in the quality of medical education, and to such local increases in medical
expertise as result from acquisition of new therapeutic tools, acceptance of
66. See note 58 supra.
67. Sanctions range from informal private reproof of a superior through formal
reprimand, demotion by one or more levels in the hierarchy, to expulsion from the
medical staff. The flexibility of this system allows it to be applied in whatever measure
appropriate. Accordingly, staff sanctions are available for relatively minor transgressions,
and are not confined (as are formal state delicensure proceedings and the rough justice of
tort remedy) largely to the criminal or grossly negligent physician. In contrast to the in-
formality of medical staff proceedings, grievance committees of local medical societies are
encouraged to give such due process protections as the presumption of innocence, the right
to counsel, the right to appeal, the right to cross examine, and the right not to be con-
victed of any offense not contained in the formal statement of charges. See, Model By-
laws (for Grievance Conmittes), in MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY ComMnEF OF THE AMA,
REPORT TO THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Appendix 4, June 1961.
68. The JCAH is an organization sponsored by the American College of Surgeons,
the American College of Physicians, The American Hospital Association and the Ameri-
can Medical Association. It is, however, an autonomous corporation. See By-laws ol the
JCAH, AMERICAN HosPITAL AsSOCIATIoN, HOSPITAL ACcREDITATIoN REFERENCEs (rev.
ed. 1961).
69. Refusal of accreditation automatically withdraws recognition of internship and
residency training administered by that hospital. This seriously curtails the hospital's
ability to secure the very cheap expert services of such trainees.
70. An example may be seen in varying hospital practice as far as allowing general
practitioners to conduct surgical operations is concerned. GP's are generally barred front
surgery in large and middle-sized hospitals, but are still widely allowed to conduct opera-
tions in smaller hospitals serving areas with a relative shortage of board or college certi-
fied surgeons. Cf. Hendryx, It's Time GP's Dropped Surgeryl, Medical Economics, Nov.
5, 1962, p. 118. A considerable number of litigated staff membership cases have arisen
when a general practitioner formerly allowed to perform operations is excluded so that
the hospital may retain or attain JCAH accreditation. See, e.g., Hughes v. Good Samari-




research contracts or increase in hospital size.71 As might be expected, be-
cause of these possibilities for change in hierarchy standards, the standards
tend to be vaguely spelled out in medical staff bylaws, if they are spelled out
at all. 72 This vagueness stems not merely from the possibility of ciange, but
also from the conscious intent of draftsmen seeking to allow the widest pos-
sible discretion in the weighing of any particular physician's qualifications.
The JCAH urges hospitals to enact bylaws allowing those considering the
granting or withholding of privileges from a physician to take into account
personal factors difficult to allow for in standards of general application."
If it be granted that the protection of care quality is an important enough
interest to require that any error through inexactness in the system fall on
the side of better standards, rather than fairness to the particular physician,
the JCAH position is certainly a correct one. The prevalence of team prac-
tice 74 in the most complex areas of medicine and the closeness with which
team-members operate suggest that the ability of a physician to work har-
moniously with other team-members be weighed when he seeks to enter such
an area. In other contexts, the quality of care would be best served not by
promoting a staff-member on the basis of his formal training alone, but also
by consideration of such personal factors as how he responds to emergency
and responsibility, how well such almost unmeasurable qualities as his diag-
nostic intuition and surgical "nerve" meet the requirements of the position
he seeks, and how well he "relates" to patients and his fellows. Similarly, in
cases involving demotion or discharge of a physician from the staff, if first
considerations are for care quality, the staff should be able - without conform-
ing to judicially prescribed standards of due process - to demote or discharge
the doctor who has a previous history of wrongdoing,75 or who gives his
colleagues a general impression of incompetence, or who has had his judgment
or skill affected by poor health or advancing age,70 or who is temperamentally
unstable to a degree that it affects the quality of his work or the successful
functioning and morale of other staff members.
71. The effect of improved hospital facilities in attracting higher quality physicians
to an area was cited as an argument for the passage of the Hospital Survey and Con-
struction Act by a spokesman for the state which will be the first to feel the effects of
Cone. See quotation from the testimony of Dr. Carl V. Reynolds, State Health Officer of
North Carolina, S. RPa. No. 674, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1945).
72. See, e.g., Model By-laws, Art. VI, § 2.
73. See AmmcAN HosprrAL AssocrATioN, HosprrAL AccRFrTATiozi REFmmcr.Es
112-14 (rev. ed. 1961).
74. This phrase, not a medical term of art, is here used to describe the informal for-
mation of teams of practitioners to carry out complex therapeutic procedures within
a given hospital.
75. As ir Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 345 P.2d 93
(1959).
76. Cf. AmxsacAN HosprrAL AssOcIATio, HosprrAL AccR rrATio; REmEzcES
113 (rev. ed. 1961).
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This broad discretion, as efficient a device as it can be in protecting the
quality of care, can be, of course, equally efficient in excluding Negroes or
other minority groups from hospital staffs,77 and there is no doubt it is some-
times so used, despite JCAH adjurations against such use.71 Perhaps the
simplest alternative open to the court is simply to order admission of plaintiff
physicians and leave to the legislature future regulation of the quality of care.
Even assuming the legislature met this challenge, there probably would still
be adverse consequences to care quality. Even were the statutory scheme to
incorporate the hospital staff's hierarchical structure and provide for a variety
of limited term licenses based on competence in each specialty area, it still
might lack the flexibility necessary to deal with the constantly increasing com-
plexity of medical practice.79
Alternatively - although it seems unlikely - the court might itself assume
the burden of developing higher standards and applying them as cases come
77. See note 43 supra.
78. HARRISON, CONTROL OF MEDICAL STAFF APrOINTMENTS IN VOLUNTAR1Y NoN-
PRoF=T HosPrrALs 25 (1963).
79. Probably the most appropriate form of statute would set forth broadly-phrased
standards and provide for the creation of an administrative agency to issue regulations
setting up the hierarchy and the appropriate level of competence for each. Perhaps tie
closest existing analogue to such a structure is federal legislation governing amateur
radio transmission. Under the authority and within the broad guidelines of the Com-
munications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.), the Federal Communications Commission has
erected a licensure hierarchy according to which radio amateurs are graded as to coin-
petence and according to which they are granted the right to transmit radio signals of
various power levels, and on, various frequency bands. 1964 THE RADIO AMATEUR'S
HANDBOOK 11-14. Licenses are issued for a limited time only, and the act provides that
they confer no property rights in the holder. 48 Stat. 1081 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1958).
The commission has the power to determine frequency assignments. 48 Stat. 1082 (1934).
47 U.S.C. § 303c (1958). Or it may suspend or amend any license. 48 Stat. 1082 (1934),
47 U.S.C. §§ 303(m) & (f) (1958). Despite the flexibility of the commission's power
evident on the face of the statute, regulations governing amateur operation have been
allowed to become relatively inflexible. The original allocation of frequency bands gave
amateurs the region of the spectrum below 200 meters in wave-length. Act of Aug. 13,
1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302. These wave lengths were then thought useless. 1964 RADIo
AmATau's HANDBOx 7. Later discovery that they are instead the most valuable for long-
distance transmission did not keep amateurs from retaining substantial portions of this
band for their use. Id. at 13. While the nature of electromagnetic communication has
changed even more radically than the nature of medicine in recent years the amateur
operator hierarchy and the approximate levels of competence required for each step have
remained generally stable. A proposed plan for raising competence standards for some
steps of the hierarchy has brought widespread opposition.by amateur operators (see, c.g.,
letters in Correspondence from Members, QST, Nov. 1963, p. 83) even though the change
may be necessary to prevent substantial curtailment of amateur operation in the long run,
QST, Oct. 1963, p. 48. This perhaps suggests that an agency charged with regulating
hospital staff appointments might find itself similarly pressured to maintain the status
quo by physicians and organizations of physicians. The JCAH, which presently imposes
hierarchical standards on hospitals is effectively insulated from such pressures by the fact
that its immediate constituency is not composed of individual physicians, but of four
national organizations of hospitals and physicians.
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before it. But even if the court succeeded in acquiring the considerable amount
of expertise necessary, problems would remain. Courts are institutionally com-
mitted to modes of thought which could seriously affect care quality; pre-
occupation with due process could easily result in overly considerate treatment
of the erring or negligent physician,80 and the judicial tendency to allow the
rule of a particular case to harden into a doctrine of law 81 could result in the
establishment of a set of criteria for competence which although proper for
the time and place where first applied, might eventually become as outdated
as present licensing statutes. Nor would the delegation of the task of setting
standards to an impartial expert provide a viable solution. Such an expert,
granted his appointment was procedurally and practically feasible, 2 might be
unencumbered by inappropriate judicial attitudes, but he would still face cer-
tain of the other difficulties which would confront a court. Both would find it
hard to judge accurately the standards of competence appropriate to a par-
ticular hospital, and both would find it difficult to obtain the kind of observa-
tional and "demeanor" evidence a medical staff may gather by watching the
day-to-day performance of a practitioner.83 Moreover, the expert, himself a
physician,84 might have certain peculiar disabilities. There are in all branches
of medicine legitimately competing approaches and therapies for many diseases
and conditions, and the expert might unfairly deal with a medical staff whose
80. Cf. Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist, 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 345 P2d 93 (1954).
81. This "tendency," which is no more than the doctrine of stare decisis under an-
other name, cannot be condemned. It is the main tool which a court has to enable it to
move along the continuum between "fact" and "law." However, inr any situation in which
the "legal" principle to be served is vague and formless (e.g., "good medical care," or
exclusion of "coerced confessions") and there are a multiplicity of factual elements to be
considered, this tool loses its edge and the court is faced with a choice of (a) preserving
the rule by inventing exceptions to it and eventually producing a meaningless labyrinth or
(b) deciding the issue on a case-to-case basis. The first alternative is hardly desirable
in any case; the second, although it may work fairly well in some areas, such as coerced
confession [e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)] would be somewhat clumsy
if applied to Cone-type cases. Only the Supreme Court is competent to try cases on "the
totality of circumstances," and since this technique invites, rather than discourages litiga-
tion, the Court is wise to reserve it for hard constitutional questions. The constitutional
question in the area of medical staff appointments is settled by Cone, and while requiring
the Court to weigh every medical staff admission case would prevent the formulation of a
too-rigid "rule," it would also add a constitutionally unnecessary burden to the Court's
docket. The Court has, on occasion, chosen to abandon all "rules" and decide non-con-
stitutional questions on a case by case basis [cf. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591
(1944)] but the wisdom of this practice is not thereby established.
82. There appears no reason why the court could not appoint a master in such situa-
tions. Fmn. R. Civ. P. 53. There might be difficulty in some parts of the country, however,
securing an expert conversant with hospital and medical affairs who is sympathetic to
the goals of Cone.
83. See note 65 slpra.
84. It would seem pointless to shift responsibility to a master unless the master were
better situated to consider the factual elements than the judge. The only persons so situated
would be physicians or hospital administrators, who often hold 1f.D. degrees.
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disaffection with the plaintiff-physician was not racial, but theoretical in origin.
It may be suggested that both care quality and the progress of medical research
are best served by allowing hospitals to commit themselves to one of the avail-
able theories of treatment and to select staff members in accordance with this
commitment.8 5
Since the medical staff seems to be the only agency able to bring the ad-
vantages of experience and knowledge to the definition and application of
medical standards, it may be suggested that the court seeking to enforce
non-discrimination would be best advised to treat the staff almost as if it
were an administrative agency, ceding to it the judgment of competence
and attempting to prevent the use of race as a criterion through some form
of review. The problem then becomes one of finding a form of review which
best serves the goals of both non-discrimination and care quality. The
simplest review proceeding would involve only ascertaining whether the
staff bylaws included a formal or informal discriminatory proviso. If such a
provision were included, the court could strike it down as unconstitutional
and order the applicant's competence considered without regard to his race.
This is the form which review has assumed in a number of other hospital
staff cases,88 and it is the form which may well commend itself to the district
court in Cone.87 There is no danger that care quality would be compromised
by this action, and it is probable that such a method would meet with the
approval of most hospital staffs and administrators.8 8 However, the wide dis-
cretion enjoyed by hospital staffs would enable them to evade the order; ex-
perience in other areas has demonstrated the ineffectiveness of merely horta-
tory judicial attempts to control the mental process of administrative tribu-
nals.8 9
Cone's mandate could be far better enforced, it might be argued, if the
review of staff decisions were made on the model of trial do novo. In such a
proceeding, the court would require all evidence gathered by the staff, including
other doctors' observations of the plaintiff-physician, to be placed on the record
before it, and would take further evidence regarding the particular level of
competence required for the particular staff appointment in the hospital in-
volved. It could then decide whether, apart from his race, the plaintiff met the
hospital's standards, and, if he did, it could order him admitted or reinstated.
85. Both the effective administration of a therapeutic program and reliable evaluation
of its medical validity could be made exceedingly difficult if a portion of the program had
to be entrusted to a staff-member who sincerely believed it to be wrong.
86. This is the New Jersey court's approach. See note 1 supra.
87. As of Sept. 1, 1964, no order had been entered. Communication from Office of
the Clerk, United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.
88. Except for its application to portions of a hospital complex not themselves con-
structed with federal aid, such an order would go little further than the repeal of the
§ 291e(f) proviso favored by the American Hospital Association, Hospitals, Sept. 16, 1963,
p. 95.
89. See, e.g., the Biscayne cases, gathered in JAFFE & NATHANSON, CASES ON AD-
mImisTRATivF LAW 371-82 (1961).
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Here, again, a recalcitrant staff could probably frustrate the court by rejecting
an applicant on the basis of imagined or distorted evidence, but the fact that
this would require a conspiracy to commit perjury on the part of high-level
staff members makes it seem unlikely. The real difficulty with this form of
review lies elsewhere. Physicians are extremely reluctant to discuss openly the
errors and misdeeds of fellow practitioners; indeed, to do so may be con-
sidered unethical.90 To present a staff considering disciplinary action against
a member with the possibility that the grounds for such action might one day
become public would be to insure that no action would be taken except in the
most flagrant cases of abuse. Thus the tendency would be to suppress personal
and observational evidence 01 of misdeeds. The possibility of de novo judicial
review of staff discipline decisions would therefore destroy the flexibility which
enables that discipline to operate against minor as well as major infractions
of standards of good practice, and some improper behavior now penalized
would go unpunished. Moreover, even if this difficulty could be avoided,,2 a
further danger to care quality might still be presented by inappropriate judicial
reluctance to give proper weight to personal evidence. 3 Both of the problems
presented -by this more searching form of review stem from attitudes toward
the personal and observational evidence involved. It seems, therefore, that the
de -novo review would be practical only if, without compromising the quality
of care, the evidence adduced before the court could be limited to such im-
personal and readily obtainable data as (for the applicant) school grades,
90. While proscription of such behavior is not contained in formal codes of ethics, it
is nevertheless considered improper:
Governing all these relationships [between physicians] is the fundamental need
of the profession to present a united front No body of men is more criticized than
doctors: we must not foster that criticism by criticizing each other - at any rate
we must not let it be known that we do so.
Ogilvie, The Doctor's Relationship to his Professional Colleagues, 2E1FDICAL ETiCS
(1957).
91. "Observational evidence" is used here to denote knowledge of medical negligence
or wrongdoing gained by other physicians who, working side by side with the erring
practitioner, have a chance to observe him in action. Such evidence, of course not hearsay,
would be admissible in any court to demonstrate that the errant act was in fact committed,
or rather, that the testifier believes he saw it committed. The category of "personal evi-
dence" is here used in an effort to allow for some of the basically imponderable aspects
of medical practice, such as the intuitive act of diagnosis or the ability of a good surgeon
to act quickly and surely in dealing with a sudden emergency on the operating table.
"Personal evidence" is thus used to denote the kind of evidence which could be given by
another practitioner who observed the erring physician make a medically justifiable but
wrong choice in a diagnostic situation or surgical emergency, when a better practitioner,
presented with the same circumstances, would have made the correct decision. Such evi-
dence would be vital in deciding whether to give the erring doctor a position of great
responsibility in the hierarchy, but would of course be almost surely discredited by
vigorous cross-examination, especially if standard treatises were used to impeach the
witness.
92. E.g., by taking the evidence in camera.
93. See note 91 supra.
1964]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
proof of postgraduate training and recommendations from teachers and supe-
riors and (for the hospital) statements of the amount of formal training re-
quired for a given appointment. But, as has been suggested,04 the effect on
care of such a limitation of evidence could, in some circumstances, be quite
serious.
However, examination of the kinds of decisions medical staffs make in dif-
ferent contexts and at different hierarchical levels suggests that personal and
observational evidence are not of equal importance in every staff judgment. The
great responsibility entrusted to the specialist at the top of the hierarchy and
the necessarily intimate team practice in which he must often engage demand
that personal and observational data be weighed in considering his case. They
are perhaps not so crucial, however, in testing the basic intelligence and general
medical knowledge required of a physician performing the much less dangerous
procedures at the bottom of the hierarchy. Further, while data gained from
personal observation of a physician's performance may be carefully considered
in deciding questions of discharge, demotion or even promotion, it is often not
considered in weighing admission to the staff, simply because of its unavail-
ability.95 This suggests that a court attempting to enforce non-discrimination
may, with some confidence that it is not endangering the quality of care,
review - on the basis of impersonal evidence of professional training and
competence - staff exclusions of Negro physicians when such exclusions in-
volve refusals to admit the plaintiff to the lower levels of the hierarchy. It
also suggests that as staff decisions shift from contexts involving admission to
those involving promotion, demotion and expulsion, and as they involve higher
levels in the hierarchy, the court should feel more reluctant to review and
reverse them on impersonal evidence, and instead should rely increasingly on
the device of remand with a hortatory adjuration to disregard race. It is
is difficult to enunciate an easily-manageable standard by which the court
could decide when a particular staff decision is so based on personal and ob-
servational evidence that summary reversal would be improper. Perhaps the
best guidelines for decision in the hard case would be provided by a careful
assessment of the amount of such evidence actually available to the staff in
making the decision, and the degree of competence required for the staff
position in question in relation to requirements for the rest of the hierarchy.
In practice, since a large majority of Cone-type cases will probably be brought
by physicians denied admission to the lowest level of the hierarchy,0 this more
94. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
95. If the applicant has never been on the staff, its members have in all probability
(barring his membership in another medical staff to which they also belong) never had a
chance to observe him and thus to gain personal or observational evidence of his com-
petence.
96. Negroes are the only minority group effectively barred from hospital medical
staffs in the United States, and the majority of Negro physicians tend to be general prac-
titioners. See note 43 supra. As general practitioners, at all but the smallest hospitals they
are qualified to enter only the lower hierarchical levels.
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difficult problem may not arise for some time. In addition, there are indications
that once Negro physicians are granted access to the hierarchy, their promotion
may not be seriously inhibited by discriminatory attitudes.9 7
A problem more likely to materialize is expulsion on grounds of incom-
petence of Negro physicians the court has ordered admitted to the staff. If the
action is the result of a sudden raising of the level of formal training required
for staff appointment, the court should not automatically conclude that such
an upgrading in requirements is mere sham, for standards of competence are
sometimes suddenly raised for legitimate reasons.98 Instead, the court might
consider such factors as whether the change was one required by the JCAH
as a condition of continued accreditation, whether the hospital had undergone
some major improvement which attracted more qualified physicians to it and
whether the new higher standard is in fact being enforced against white phy-
sicians at the same hierarchical level. If the staff seeks to justify expulsion on
the ground of personal and observational evidence, the court would have no
choice but to require that such evidence and additional evidence regarding
practices of similarly-ranked white staff members be spread before it, in order
that it be enabled to itself decide the justification for expulsion. As has been
suggested, this would tend to have some bad effect on care quality. But the
effect would be a small one,9 9 and it seems necessary to preclude evasion of
non-discrimination orders issued under the mandate of Cone.
97. Research in another area suggests the possibility that white physicians, however
prejudiced they may be toward Negroes, might tend not to extend this prejudice to Negro
physicians with whom they work, regarding such physicians as atypical members of their
race against whom discriminatory sanctions need not be applied. See Berg, Ethnic Atti-
tudes and Agreement of White Persons with a Negro Person in the Autokinetie Situation
[unpublished doctoral thesis on file in the University of Pennsylvania Library, XXIII
DissmRTAxrox ABsTRAcrs 334 (1961)].
98. See notes 70 & 71 supra and accompanying text.
99. Presumably, there would be no reluctance on the part of the staff to offer obser-
vatonal evidence in such cases, but the court could still probably decline to give much
weight to personal evidence, which is certainly an element in deciding whether to keep a
physician on a medical staff. If personal evidence did tend to show error on the part of
the physician, and the court, ignoring it, ordered the hospital to retain him on the staff,
care quality at such a hospital would ex Iypothesi decline. The quantum of this reduction
in standards is not likely to be great, however, since the Negro physician is likely to be
at a hierarchical level where the kind of intuitive judgment personal evidence goes to is
not as important as it is at top levels, and court orders compelling retention of a physician
despite the existence of derogatory personal evidence probably would occur only when the
physician had previously been ordered admitted to the staff under the Cone doctrine.
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